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Liability For Sexual Abuse: The Anomalous
Immunity of Churches.
Jill Fedje*
The problem of the philandering minister is not confined to
the fictional character depicted in Nathaniel Hawthorne's The
Scarlet Letter. Unfortunately, sexual exploitation' by members of
the clergy2 occurs with surprising frequency. Between 1983 and
1987 approximately two hundred Roman Catholic priests or broth-
ers were publicly accused of sexual contact with children.3 Other-
wise stated, approximately once a week the Roman Catholic
Church faced the devastating effects of having one of its represent-
atives accused of child abuse.4 Over twenty priests have been con-
victed and imprisoned on sexual abuse charges since 1983.5
According to a Dominican canon lawyer, there may be as many as
three thousand priests in the United States suffering from
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1. For purposes of this article, clerical sexual exploitation and clerical sexual
abuse are defined as any interactions of a sexual nature (1) between a clergy mem-
ber and a minor parishioner or (2) between a clergy member and a parishioner of
any age whom he is counseling. It encompasses a broad spectrum of behavior, in-
cluding any form of or requests for sexual penetration; kissing;, or contact to the
breasts, genital area, or clothing covering these areas. The consent of the parish-
ioner is not an issue.
2. The definition of clergy depends on the religious group involved. For pur-
poses of this article, it shall include "[a] person who becomes a cleric through the
reception of diaconate and... [by being] incardinated into the particular church or
personal prelature for whose service he has been advanced." Raymond C. O'Brien,
Pedophilia: The Legal Predicament of Clergy, 4 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 91,
92 n.5 (1988) (citation omitted). This definition also encompasses any "minister,
priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a religious organization, or and individ-
ual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him." Proposed Fed. R.
Evid. 506 (as submitted to Congress).
Further, by using the male gender the author is neither implying that clerics
are exclusively male nor expressing a preference for male clergy. Rather, it is used
because the cases and research relied upon uncovered only male perpetrators.
3. Jason Berry, Church Must Face the Sexual Crisis among Its Clergy, Mpls.
Star Trib., Sept. 26, 1989, at 15, col. 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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pedophilia.6 This figure represents approximately five percent of
all American priests.7 The results of a recent Wisconsin study in-
dicate that members of the clergy represent eleven percent of all
sexual misconduct perpetrated by mental health counselors.8
Although much of the available studies and cases address sexual
abuse within the Roman Catholic Church, this phenomenon knows
no denominational boundary.9  For example, in Minnesota
churches have established a statewide interdenominational com-
mittee to address the issue of sexual exploitation by members of
the clergy.1O
The financial consequences of sexual abuse scandals can be
devastating to churches. For example, some dioceses of the Ro-
man Catholic Church have lost their insurance coverage for child
sexual abuse cases, which has forced the Church to institute lim-
ited self-insurance plans."! A 1985 report to the U.S. Catholic
Bishops projected that certain dioceses of the Roman Catholic
Church could spend approximately one billion dollars in the next
decade compensating victims of clerical sexual abuse. 12
Despite the prevalence and significance of this problem, it has
not been adequately addressed by the court system. Applicable
case law illustrates a judicial failure to hold churches liable for
clerical sexual abuse.13 This article argues for the imposition of
civil liability on churches for the clerical sexual abuse of parishio-
6. Id. Pedophilia refers to a sexual orientation:
towards children, regardless of whether the children are pre- or
postpubertal.... [This definition includes three elements.] First, it is
necessary to establish that the patient becomes erotically excited by
the act or fantasy of engaging in sexual activities with children. Sec-
ondly, if the patient is an adult, rather than adolescent, the children
must be at least ten years his junior. Finally, it must be clear that any
sexual acts engaged in with children are not either due to other
mental disorders such as schizophrenia, dementia or drug intoxication,
or due to the lack of a suitable age-appropriate partner, which occurs
in some cases of incarceration or incest.
O'Brien, supra note 2, at 93 (quoting Berlin, Sex Offenders: A Biomedical Perspec-
tive and a Status Report on Biomedical Treatment, in Sexual Aggressor, Current
Perspectives on Treatment 83, 86-87 (1983)). Studies indicate that the average
pedophile is heterosexual and experiences 265 sexual contacts in his or her lifetime.
Members of the clergy who abuse sexually mature minors are not considered to be
pedophiles, although they could be prosecuted for statutory rape. Rorie Sherman,
Warnings Ignored? Legal Spotlight on Priests Who are Pedophiles, Nat'l L.J.,
April 4, 1988, at 28.
7. Berry, supra note 3, at 15, col. 1.
8. Kenneth Woodward, When a Pastor Turns Seducer, Newsweek, Aug. 28,
1989, at 48.
9. Sherman, supra note 6, at 28.
10. Woodward, supra note 8, at 48.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See section I of this article (notes 11-50 infra and accompanying text).
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ners. Churches, however, should not be strictly liable. Rather, lia-
bility should be limited to situations in which the church failed to
properly investigate a minister prior to placement in a congrega-
tion or failed to investigate allegations of the minister's sexual
misconduct.
The discussion is divided into three sections. Section I exam-
ines the scant case law on this topic and discusses the failure of the
judicial system to impose liability on churches for clerical sexual
abuse of parishioners. Section II presents a number of theories
which have been successfully employed to impose liability on non-
religious institutions for the sexual misconduct of their employees.
Curiously, these theories of recovery have not been applied by the
courts to impose liability on churches for the sexual misconduct of
their clergy. This section argues that judicial consistency man-
dates extending these theories of liability to churches. The article
concludes by proposing that state legislatures adopt statutes re-
quiring churches to investigate for sexual impropriety prior to hir-
ing ministers. The proposed statute defines the investigative duty
of a church. A statutory proposal would serve the dual purpose of
protecting potential victims from a hidden abuser as well as pro-
tecting churches from the high costs of litigation and settlement by
defining the required duty of investigation.
I. Judicial Reluctance to Impose Liability
Many victims of clerical sexual abuse have received large set-
tlements from their respective churches without actually litigating
the issue of liability.14 Those who have reached the courts, how-
ever, have not fared well. Judicial decisions indicate a reluctance
to hold churches liable for the sexual acts of their dysfunctional
clergy. This manifests itself in a judicial hesitation to rule on the
substantive issue of clerical sexual exploitation, thus leading to dis-
missal on procedural grounds.15
Sexual abuse victims and their families who do bring civil
suits against churches have pursued a number of theories. These
14. In Louisiana a plaintiff received a 1.8 million dollar jury verdict for sexual
abuse by a Catholic priest. The abuse occurred while the victim served as an altar
boy. In an earlier case involving the same priest, the Reverend Gilbert Gauthe, an-
other plaintiff received 1.25 million dollars. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1987, at 46, col. 3.
"[The Roman Catholic] church ... along with its insurance companies has paid out
more than 5.5 million to thirteen other victims in nine families in Lafayette Par-
ish." United Press Int'l, Feb. 3, 1986, am. cycle. The prevalence and lucrative na-
ture of these claims has allowed some litigation attorneys to develop a subspecialty
in claims against churches for sexual abuse by clergy members. Sherman, supra
note 6, at 28.
15. See infra notes 17-64 and accompanying text.
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include respondeat superior, agency principles, negligent hiring
and/or negligent retention of an unfit employee, and failure to
properly supervise the victim.16 Although such theories routinely
provide relief for victims of sexual abuse by non-clergy,17 they
have proven unsuccessful for victims of sexual abuse by ministers.
No viable explanation exists for this unequal treatment. Similarly
situated plaintiffs deserve similar treatment. The following cases
represent the only case law addressing the civil liability of
churches for clerical sexual abuse of parishioners and demonstrate
the courts' immunization of churches from such challenges.
In Milla v. Tamayo, seven priests sexually abused, frequently
on church premises,' 8 a sixteen-year-old girl ("Rita") who trusted
them as spiritual advisors.' 9 Despite the priests' egregious treat-
ment of Rita, the Calif9rnia Court of Appeals had the audacity to
imply that she was a co-conspirator and affirmed a lower court de-
cision that a one-year statute of limitations barred her claims. 20
Notwithstanding the procedural dismissal, the court's spurious rea-
soning and dicta provide insight into the judicial refusal to extend
civil liability in this context.
Rita was first sexually exploited by a priest in a confessional
booth.21 The priest began to fondle her.22 He assured Rita that
sexual activity with him, including intercourse, was ethical and re-
ligiously permitted.23 Later, the other priests gave Rita similar as-
surances and she complied with their sexual demands because of
these assurances.2 4 Because of the priests' religious positions, Rita
relied on their good will as spiritual advisors and counselors and
accepted their representations. 25 At that time she was devoutly
committed to the church and aspired to be a nun.26
Rita became pregnant by one of the priests. The priests de-
vised a plan to secure Rita's silence: They would send her to the
Phillipines to give birth and leave the baby there. She would then
16. Jeffrey Anderson, Civil Liability for Sexual Exploitation, pp. 3-12.
17. Id.
18. "While Rita was still sixteen, [Father] Tamayo made sexual advances to-
ward her and succeeded in kissing and fondling her breasts. Such advances took
place in a private room and in a confessional booth at St. Philomena." Appellant's
Opening Brief at 6, Mila v.'Tamayo, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1986)
(No. C485-488).
19. Id. at 6-7.
20. Milla v. Tamayo, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (1986).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1457, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
24. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 18, at 6.
25. Id.
26. Milla, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1456, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
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return to the United States without notifying anyone of her preg-
nancy, delivery, or sexual relations with the priests. Finally, a
priest would tell Rita's parents that she was going to the Phil-
lipines to study medicine.27
Promising to send money, the priests sent Rita to the Philip-
pines. They failed, however, to send adequate funds; she suffered
from malnutrition and nearly died in an emergency cesarean sec-
tion. Rita then confided in a bishop, telling him that a priest was
the father of her child. The Bishop instructed Rita not to tell any-
one and promised he would resolve the matter when he returned
to Los Angeles.2 8
Rita did not hear from him again. Upon returning to Los An-
geles, she notified another bishop of her predicament. He also as-
sured her that he would investigate the situation. Subsequently,
he told her that there was nothing he could do for her. At this
time Rita became disillusioned with the Catholic Church and
sought legal counsel.29
Rita's complaint alleged that seven priests of the Roman
Catholic Church entered into a conspiracy to have sexual contact
with her.30 The complaint contained claims of civil conspiracy,
fraud and deceit, professional malpractice, and negligence.3 ' The
trial court held that the one-year statute of limitations barred the
civil conspiracy, professional malpractice, and negligence claims. 3 2
The court also failed to hold the Archbishop liable for fraud and
deceit under the theory of respondeat superior.33 On appeal Rita's
counsel argued against affirming the trial court's decision to sus-
tain the Archbishop's demurrer. She maintained that the conspir-
acy allegations prevented the tolling of the statute of limitations
on Rita's claim since the purpose of the conspiracy was to preserve
the secrecy of these sexual encounters.34
The California Court of Appeals rejected Rita's argument and
27. Id. at 1457, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
28. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 17, at 6-10.
29. Id.




34. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 18, at 34-35.
The crux of the complaint is that the defendant priests sought to con-
ceal their misconduct from the outside world. Thus, acts designed to
conceal the sexual relations and/or Rita's pregnancy from the outside
world were in furtherance of the conspiracy. In the meanwhile, Rita
was duped into believing that the sexual relations were morally and
ethically permissible and not otherwise harmful.
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affirmed the trial court. With respect to the tolling of the statute
of limitations, it stated:
[W]e pause to note an obvious, albeit often overlooked proposi-
tion. The doctrine of fraudulent concealment [for tolling the
statute of limitations] does not come into play, whatever the
lengths to which a defendant has gone to conceal the wrongs,
if a plaintiff is on notice of a potential claim.35
The court refused to grant Rita relief because she "participated in
the object of the conspiracy" by keeping silent and, therefore, was
"clearly placed on notice."38 Her participation, however, was
merely in relying on the advice and counsel of her spiritual advi-
sors. The court clearly failed to appreciate the power and control
a Roman Catholic priest exercises over a sixteen-year-old girl as-
piring to become a nun.
The court of appeals also rejected Rita's claim against the
Archbishop under a respondeat superior theory. It reasoned, "An
employer may be held responsible for tortious conduct by an em-
ployee only if the tort is committed within the course and scope of
employment."3 7  Therefore, respondeat superior "turns on
whether (1) the act performed was either required or instant to
the employee's duties or (2) the employee's misconduct could be
reasonably foreseen as an outgrowth of the employee's duties."38
It found that sexual contact with parishioners is not a requirement
of the priesthood; therefore, Rita's claim failed the first prong of
the test.39 With respect to foreseeability, the second prong, the
court stated, "It would defy every notion of logic and fairness to
say that sexual activity between a priest and a parishioner is char-
acteristic of the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church."40
Thus, the priests' conduct was found not to be foreseeable.
The court failed to consider the foreseeability issue seriously.
First, there was evidence that two of the seven priests had previ-
ous allegations of sexual impropriety leveled against them.41 Sec-
ond, since at least once a week a clergy member is publicly accused
35. Milla, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1460, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 690 (quoting Hobson v. Wil-
son, 737 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985)).
36. Milla, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1460, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
37. Id. at 1461, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
38. Id. (quoting Martine v. Hagopian, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1223, 1228-29, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 763 (1986)) (emphasis added).
39. Milla, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1461, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
40. Id.
41. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 18, at 42 (evidence indicated that the
Archbishop knew of incidents of sexual indiscretion with other parishioners by two
of the defendant priests prior to the incidents with Rita). The Milla court, how-
ever, failed to acknowledge this alleged prior conduct in its opinion.
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of sexually abusing a child,42 it was disingenuous of the court to
hold that Rita's abuse was not foreseeable. Thus, Rita was victim-
ized not only by seven priests but also by a judicial system which
refused to see the validity of her claims.
The Schultz series of three cases fortifies the principle estab-
lished in Milla v. Tamayo that courts may cloak themselves in
procedural issues to avoid addressing the disturbing problem of
clerical sexual abuse.4 3 In the Schultz cases the plaintiffs' alleged
that the defendants were negligent in hiring and/or supervising
the defendant, Edmund Coakeley, a Franciscan Brother who sexu-
ally abused the Schultz's children. 4 The plaintiffs sought damages
for the abuse of their sons, Richard and Christopher, and for the
wrongful death of Christopher who committed suicide.4 5 They ar-
gued that Christopher committed suicide because of his inability to
cope with the trauma of the sexual abuse.46 The emotional trauma
was suffered not only by Richard and Christopher. Shortly after
the suicide, their mother suffered a nervous breakdown.47
The Franciscan Brothers assigned Coakeley to teach in a Ro-
man Catholic school in New Jersey, and he also was appointed
scout master for the school's Boy Scout troop.48 Coakeley began to
sexually abuse the boys, both in church and in school, when Rich-
ard was thirteen and Christopher only eleven years old.49 The
abuse continued on Scout camping trips.50 He threatened harm to
each boy individually to procure their silence and continued sado-
masochistic abuse of Christopher upon their return.5 1
Eventually, Richard revealed to his parents that he and
Christopher were being sexually abused by Coakeley.52 Both boys
received psychiatric care, and Christopher ultimately was placed in
a psychiatric hospital.53 Shortly thereafter, he killed himself by
ingesting a lethal dose of drugs.5 4
42. Berry, supra note 3, at 15, col. 1.
43. Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 95 N.J. 530, 472 A.2d
531, 536 (1984) [hereinafter Schultz I]; Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 102
A.D.2d 100, 476 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313 (1984) [hereinafter Schultz II]; Schultz v. Boy
Scouts of Am., Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 1165, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985) [hereinafter Schultz 111).
44. Schultz III, 64 N.Y.2d at 192, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Schultz II, 102 A.D.2d 100, 476 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313 (1984).
48. Schultz III, 64 N.Y.2d at 192, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 193, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 92.




54. Schultz III, 64 N.Y.2d 192, 193, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (1985).
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The Schultz's first brought suit against the Archdiose of
Newark, attempting to hold the defendent liable for the negligent
hiring and supervision of Brother Coakeley.55 The Supreme Court
of New Jersey, however, found that the state's charitable immu-
nity statute barred their claims. It stated, "whatever this Court's
views of immunity, we should apply this statute as the Legislature
intended."56
The Schultz's then attempted to hold the Boy Scouts of
America responsible for Coakeley's actions as a troop leader.
Since the Boy Scout camp at which the abuse occurred was located
in upstate New York, they brought the case before the New York
courts.
The Court of Appeals of New York denied the plaintiffs re-
lief.57 It held that the plaintiffs had previously litigated the same
claim against the Archdiocese in the New Jersey action. There-
fore, the court reasoned, they were collaterally estopped from re-
litigating these claims in New York.58 The court relied upon the
Supreme Court of New Jersey's application of the New Jersey
charitable immunity statute,59 despite the fact that New York had
abolished its charitable immunity statute over thirty years ago and
that much of the abuse occurred in New York.60 Consequently,
neither the New Jersey nor the New York courts considered the
merits of the plaintiffs' case.
The dissent in the New York Court of Appeals' decision ex-
poses the weaknesses of the majority's analysis. The dissent
opined that New York's interest in applying the New Jersey chari-
table immunity statute is too attenuated when compared with New
York's strong interest in applying its charitable non-immunity pol-
icy. Accordingly, New York's public policy should prevail, and the
55. Schultz I, 95 N.J. 530, 472 A.2d 531, 532 (1984).
56. Id. at 471, A.2d at 535 (citations omitted).
57. Schultz III, 64 N.Y.2d 1165, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
58. Id. at 205, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
59. Schultz I, 95 N.J. 530, 472 A.2d 531, 536 (1984).
The New Jersey Supreme Court split four to three on whether the charitable
immunity statute should apply. The majority held that the legislature had spoken
on the issue by statutorily barring the plaintiff's claim. Id. The dissent argued that
the statute applied to negligent acts but remained silent on the issue of liability for
intentional torts. Id. at 543. The dissent also stated that the immunity was condi-
tional, not automatic. "Immunity does not attach simply because the entity is a
charity. Rather, its availability is determined by whether the entity is acting chari-
tably when the tortious conduct occurs." Id. at 542. As the sexual exploitation of
Christopher and Richard "destroyed any vestige of a beneficent nexus" between
the boys and the defendants, the dissent believed that the charitable immunity stat-
ute should not apply. Id. at 543.
60. Schultz III, 64 N.Y.2d at 202, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
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plaintiffs' claims should not be barred.61 It reasoned:
There can be no question that this State has a paramount in-
terest in preventing and protecting against injurious miscon-
duct within its borders. This interest is particularly vital and
compelling where, as here, the tortious misconduct involves
sexual abuse and exploitation of children, regardless of the
residency of the victims and the tort-feasors.62
Even if the defendants' negligent hiring and retention of
Coakeley began in New Jersey, the negligence ultimately impacted
on the state of New York. New York has an overriding interest in
protecting persons from the criminal activity of which Brother
Coakeley is charged. 3 Indeed, New York has a compelling inter-
est in enforcing civil laws against an abuser like Coakeley and the
institutions of which he is an agent.64 Once again, due to an un-
willingness to address the substantive issues of clerical sexual
abuse, courts denied recovery to a deserving plaintiff by cloaking
themselves in a procedural shroud.
II. Recovery Theories
The anomalous immunity from liability that churches enjoy
is exposed by examining courts' interpretation and application of
various recovery theories in cases of sexual exploitation by an em-
ployer's agent or employee. This also illustrates the unequal and
unjustifiable benefit to churches bestowed by such immunity. Spe-
cific theories discussed include respondeat superior, agency law,
negligent hiring, and negligent retention of an unfit employee.
A. Respondeat Superior
Courts should impose liability on churches for clerical sexual
abuse on the basis of respondeat superior. A non-negligent party
can be held liable under respondeat superior based on a relation-
ship the non-negligent party has with the party at fault.65 For ex-
ample, this theory is frequently utilized to hold employers liable
for the acts of their employees.86 Respondeat superior differs from
negligent hiring and negligent retention of an unfit employee in
that the former is not based on the negligence of the employer but
rather imputes the negligence or intentional conduct of the em-
61. Id. at 205, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
62. Id. at 207, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
63. Id. at 208, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
64. Id. at 208-11, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 103-04.
65. William Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 69, at 499 (1971).
66. Id. at 500.
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ployee onto the employer.6 7 Liability under respondeat superior is
deemed justified since the employer chose the employee and en-
trusted her to a responsible position.68 Accordingly, it is consid-
ered more equitable that the employer suffer as a result of the
employee's misbehavior rather than an innocent victim. 6 9
Many commentators suggest that the availability of respon-
deat superior stems from the prevalent social policies of risk
spreading and deterrence and from the general concern for com-
pensating injured plaintiffs. The risk spreading theory posits that
institutions are more capable both of compensating victims and of
insuring against such risks; consequently, they should be held lia-
ble.70 Deterrence proponents suggest that an employer who is held
liable for the wrongful acts of employees has an incentive to care-
fully select, instruct, and supervise them.71
Although churches as charitable institutions are not able to
pass the cost of compensation on to society through increased
prices of products or services, churches should be held accountable
for two reasons. First, churches are in a better position than indi-
vidual plaintiffs to bear the financial cost of clerical abuse by ob-
taining liability insurance. Second, churches have the control




69. Ralph L. Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Willful Torts of His
Servants, 45 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 1, 14 (1968).
70. Id. at 3 (quoting Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444,
457-58 (1923)) ("It is socially more expedient to spread or distribute among a large
group of the community the losses which experience has taught are inevitable in
the carrying on of industry, than to cast the loss upon a few.").
71. Even when insurance becomes unavailable, large religious institutions such
as the Roman Catholic Church have instituted self-insurance plans. Sherman,
supra note 6, at 28.
72. See Chancellor Kevin McDonough, Some Painful Lessons in Pastoral Re-
sponsibility: A Presentation to the Bishops of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of
America, 3-4 (October 12, 1989) ("It is critical that we not promise more administra-
tive control than we are capable of exercising, and conversely, it is also critical that
we have the self-discipline to follow through on our public commitments to supervi-
sion and responsibility. The lawsuits brought against Church administrators alleg-
ing negligence on our part reflect this principle. We are being held accountable for
the way we hold others accountable.").
One example of possible internal mechanisms that religious organizations can
use to prevent abuse is the following set of guidelines promulgated by a Minnesota
interdenominational committee:
To prevent further sexual exploitation by clergy, the following recom-
mendations are proposed:
* Religious endorsing bodies and/or seminars should do care-
ful screening.
* Seminaries should encourage or require courses and work-
shops for students and clergy on:
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Under respondeat superior an employer is held liable for the
intentional torts of an employee if the employee was acting within
the general scope of employment or if the activity was in a broad
sense job-connected.7 3 Thus, an employer can be held liable when
an employee has sexually exploited an individual if the exploita-
tion had some causal connection to the employee's job.7 4 For ex-
ample, courts have held mental health clinics liable when
therapists employed by the clinics sexually exploit patients.75
Courts focus on whether the source of the abuse is related to the
therapist's duties and whether the sexual activity occurs within
the scheduled time and place of the therapy session.76 A "but for"
* sexual abuse/exploitation;
" power and authority of the role of religious leader;




* sound interpersonal and sexual boundaries;
* Clergy and seminaries should be encouraged to adopt life
patterns that promote physical, mental, emotional and spiri-
tual health.
* Counseling supervision and support systems should be avail-
able for clergy and seminarians.
The Minnesota Interfaith Committee on Sexual Exploitation by Clergy, Entrusted
to Our Care, Sexual Exploitation by Clergy: Reflections and Guidelines for Reli-
gious Leaders, 1989 (unpublished report) [hereinafter Interfaith Committee].
73. Brill, supra note 69, at 11-14 ("Thus, it would seem that the trend of deci-
sions is to broaden substantially the meaning of 'scope of employment,' and to in-
clude within its coverage personal failings of the servant which have some causal
relationship to his job.").
74. Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of Am., 243 F.2d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 1957) (the
employee "was armed by his principal with the means to do what he did and.., the
excess of his activities beyond his authority is at the principal's risk"); see generally
Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Clinic for Sexual Relationships with Patients
by Staff Physicians, Psychologists, and Other Healers, 45 A.L.R. 4th 289 (1986).
75. Marston v. Mpls. Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306
(Minn. 1982); see generally Annotation, supra note 74.
76. Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 310 (quoting Lange. v. National Biscuit Co., 297
Minn. 399, 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1973)). In Marston a psychologist employed by the
clinic took advantage of his position as a therapist to engage in sexual relations
with two patients. Focusing on the clinic's liability, the court concluded.
Dr. Nuernberger, however, did act intentionally. In his relations with
his patients, he intentionally departed from the standards of his pro-
fession, not, it is true, to cause harm to the two patients, but rather to
confer a personal benefit on himself. This does not appear to be sim-
ply a case of a mutual infatuation; rather, it seems to be one where it
is shown that the doctor imposes his personal, improper designs on the
patient in a professional setting and---as some of the evidence sug-
gests-the patient submits to the advances because of the very mental
and emotional problems for which she is being professionally treated,
thereby exacerbating these problems. In such a case, a jury might find
that the employee's conduct is so related to the employment that the
employer may be vicariously liable.
Id. at 310-11.
Regarding infractions committed by members of all professional associations, a
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causation test is applied: but for the abusing therapist's employ-
ment with the mental health institution, the victim would not
have consulted the therapist and the abuse would not have oc-
curred.77 In short, if the sexual activity coalesced with the therapy
sessions, respondeat superior applies.
Sexual exploitation in the church is similar to sexual abuse of
mental health patients for two reasons. First, victims of sexual
abuse by the clergy are often vulnerable persons. Frequently, they
are children.78 Others are troubled individuals seeking counseling
services. 79
Second, like a psychotherapist, an abusive minister may ma-
nipulate victims by using his professional position to gain their
trust.8 0 A psychotherapist may "prescribe" sexual relations, and
the client complies because of the therapist's authority and exper-
tise. Similarly, the parishioner believes the minister is acting with
the parishoner's best interest at heart.8 1 Victims may rely on a
minister's assertion that sexual activity is religiously permissible8 2
or that a vow of celibacy only applies to heterosexual relationships,
thus allowing any homosexual activity.8 3 A minister's control is
further heightened when the sexual requests or assaults occur
when the minister is serving an ecclesiastical function.
concurring justice stated, "I would instruct the jury that because of the personal
and confidential relationship that exists between the members or employees of the
association and the patient or client of the professional association, any transgres-
sions are the responsibility of the assoication." Id, at 312 (Todd, J., concurring
specially).
77. Id, at 311.
78. See Berry, supra note 3, at 15, col. 1.
79. Woodward, supra note 8, at 48 ("for most Americans, the place to turn first
with personal problems remains the clergy").
80. See Milla v. Tamayo, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 1457, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 687
(1986) ("parish priests ... formed a conspiracy with the objective of utilizing their
positions as priests and their confidential relationship with Rita to entice her to
have sexual intercourse with them").
81. See generally Statement of Facts, J.D. v. Diocese of Winona, Archdiocese of
St. Paul & Mpls. (priest met his victims through church-sanctioned activities, in-
cluding coaching a boys' basketball team and serving as a high school principal;
other victims included altar boys and boys attending church sponsored events
under the supervision of the priest). See also Mpls. Star & Trib., Aug. 22, 1989, at
3B, col. 1 ("The [priest] abused the boy in [the priest's] office, in the church before
mass, the rectory.., and at the St. Paul Seminary. Further abuse occurred when
the victim sought counseling from another priest."). See also Sherman, supra note
6, at 29 (Louisiana priest admitted to sexually abusing at least thirty-seven children;
many, if not all, of his victims were altar boys).
82. See Milla, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1457, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 687 ("Rita had sexual
intercourse with the parish priests after having been told ... that the acts were
ethically and religiously permissible.").
83. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 21, Riedle v. Diocese of
Winona (No docket number) (1987).
1990] THE ANOMALOUS IMMUNITY OF CHURCHES 145
Since courts do not allow mental health clinics to escape lia-
bility for assaults committed by their agents, it is aberrant to grant
churches immunity for the identical sexual misconduct by their
ministers. The unjustifiable result that similarly situated plaintiffs
are treated differently exposes the unequal and favorable treat-
ment churches enjoy in these cases. A person who sought the nur-
turing and spiritual environment of a church should not be denied
recovery for assaults which transpired as a result of a minister's
desire for personal gratification. Applying the reasoning adopted
in the mental health context to the religious context, the causation
issue would be: but for the church's employment of the minister
which concomitantly stamped him as a religious and trustworthy
person, the victim would not have sought religious counsel from
the abusing minister and the sexual exploitation would not have
occurred.
Courts acknowledged the heightened vulnerability a mental
health patient has towards a therapist by allowing patients to re-
cover damages from the therapist's employer. Likewise, courts
should provide recovery for victims of sexual exploitation by min-
isters. Allowing recovery for the psychotherapist's victim and yet
refusing to allow recovery for the minister's victim sanctions in-
equitable results. A victim's right to recover damages should not
depend on whether the abuser is affiliated with a religious institu-
tion. Any inequality of treatment is clearly suspect. Thus, victims
of clerical abuse should be allowed to recover from churches under
the theory of respondeat superior.
B. Agency Law
Principles of agency law should also be available to hold
churches accountable for clerical sexual misconduct. Specifically,
the doctrine of apparent authority applies. Similar to respondeat
superior, liability based on apparent authority imputes the actions
of the employee onto the employer.8 4 This doctrine holds a princi-
pal liable for the intentional torts of employees when the tort was
caused by the nature of the employee-tortfeasor's employment po-
sition.85 Unlike respondeat superior, liability based on apparent
84. Apparent authority exists when, due to the behavior of a principal, a third
party holds a good faith belief that an agent acted with actual authority. It fre-
quently exists when the principal allows a situation which misleads the innocent
third party. Harold Reuschlein & William Gregory, The Law of Agency and Part-
nership § 23 (1990).
85. Allen 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Ana-
lysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 563, 589 (1988).
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authority does not limit liability to torts committed within the
scope of the tortfeasor's employment.8 6 According to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency, liability may be imposed on a principal if
"the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal
and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or [she] was aided
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation."87
Using the doctrine of apparent authority, courts frequently
hold employers liable for sexual assaults committed by their
agents.86 In Bowman v. Home Life Insurance Co. of America the
court applied the apparent authority doctrine of agency law to
hold an employer liable in a case that is analogous to clerical sex-
ual abuse.8 9 The deceitful way in which the employee abused his
authority is similar to the deception practiced by the sexually ex-
ploitive minister.90
In Bowman the plaintiff and her daughter applied for health
insurance with the defendant insurance company. The insurance
company had employed an underwriter who later impersonated a
physician in order to perform intimate examinations of the plain-
tiff and her daughter. To enhance his credibility, the underwriter
conducted the examinations while using information acquired
from his files containing the plaintiffs' insurance application
forms.91
The only issue on appeal was whether the insurance company
could be held liable for the intentional torts of the underwriter.92
The court of appeals cited sections 261 and 262 of the Restatement
86. Id.
87. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958).
88. See Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co., 243 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1957); Appelwhite
v. Baton Rouge, 380 So. 2d 119, 122 ("law enforcement officer [who raped plaintiff]
has abused the 'apparent authority' given such persons to act in the public inter-
est"); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (Ca. 11 1982) ("supervisor relies
upon his apparent... authority to extort sexual consideration from an employee");
see also 53 Am. Jur. 2d Master and Servant § 910 (1964).
89. Bowman, 243 F.2d at 332.
90. See generally Woodward, supra note 8, at 48.
There is what many have termed a 'power imbalance' or 'power differ-
ential' between someone seeking counseling and a clergyperson.
Clergy are invested through their position with the deepest confidence
of the parishioner who comes seeking help. Sexual contact is a gross
misuse of that power and authority. It is a massive breach of sacred
trust that takes advantage of another's vulnerability. We, as the
church, must recognize the power vested in our leadership and re-
spond faithfully to the trust of others.
Interfaith Committee, supra note 72, at 3.
91. Bowman, 243 F.2d at 333.
92. Id.
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(Second) of Agency as controlling authority9s and held that the in-
surance company was liable for the intentional torts of the under-
writer.94 It reasoned that by providing the underwriter with the
information in the files the insurance company provided him with
apparent authority to ask many questions and gain access to sub-
stantial information. The sham the underwriter perpetrated was
"a kind of deceit which was well within the insignia of office with
which he had been clothed."95
Similarly, when ministers represent to their victims that sex-
ual contact with the minister is permissible, these representations
are made "within the insignia of office" with which the church has
"clothed" the ministers.96 For example, churches represent their
clergy as standing in a special relationship to God, and parishio-
ners rely on this representation. 97 .
Indeed, in Christian denominations the minister is perceived
as Christ's representative on earth.98 When a church places au-
thority of this magnitude upon ministers it must be held accounta-
ble when that minister, by way of apparent authority, secures
compliance with his sexual demands by asserting that the sexual
activity serves a religious purpose. One authority noted, "What
makes the clerical seduction different from those of secular coun-
selors is the God factor: unlike other therapists, the minister's
power and authority are perceived as ultimately derived from the
Lord.... The God factor clouds the perceptions of the minister's
victim. 'In the victim's perspective, that person is God.' 99
93. The court quoted the following sections of the Restatement:
261. Agent's Position Enables Him to Deceive.
A principal who puts an agent in a position that enables the agent,
while apparently acting within his authority, to commit a fraud upon
third persons is subject to liability to such third persons for the fraud.
262. Agent Acts for His Own Purposes.
A person who otherwise would be liable to another for the mis-
representations of one apparently acting for him, under the rule stated
in § 261, is not relieved from liability by the fact that the apparent
agent acts entirely for his own purposes, unless the other has notice of
this.
Id. at 374 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 261 & 262 (1957)).
94. Id. at 335.
95. Id. at 334.
96. See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
97. "Responsible clergy are aware of their sacred calling as servants of God and
of their responsibility to the people entrusted to their care." Interfaith Committee,
supra note 72, at 10.
98. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Spiritual Care 10 (Jay Rochelle trans. 1985).
99. Woodward, supra note 8, at 48.
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C Negligent Hiring Theory
Negligent hiring theory is another way in which churches
could be held liable for clerical sexual abuse. Unlike respondeat
superior, negligent hiring theory focuses on the negligence of the
employer rather than the culpability of the abuser. Therefore, it
advances the element of fault which is inapplicable under respon-
deat superior.' 0 0 Negligent hiring theory does not impute the neg-
ligence of the employee onto the employer but rather finds fault in
the employer's actions or omissions. Fault is established when an
employer fails to use reasonable care in the selection or retention
of an employee and that employee injures the plaintiff.101 Success-
ful applications of negligent hiring theory demonstrate that the
employer itself is negligent because it selected or retained an em-
ployee who was unfit to fulfill the particular position. By negli-
gently placing an unfit employee in an employment situation in
which harm to others is reasonably foreseeable, the employer is
rendered liable.' 0 2 Thus, the theory places an affirmative duty on
the employer to use reasonable care in the selection and retention
of employees.'0 3
100. There are other differences between negligent hiring theory and respondeat
superior. First, punitive damages may be awarded under negligent hiring but are
not available under respondeat superior. Cindy M. Haerle, Note, Minnesota Devel-
opments-Employer Liability for the Criminal Acts of Employees under Negligent
Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. KMS. Investments, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 1303, 1306-7 (1984).
Second, longer statutes of limitation may be available for plaintiffs under negligent
hiring. Third, negligent hiring may allow a plaintiff to avoid typical respondeat su-
perior defenses, including contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Finally,
evidence of an employee's previous negligent behavior may be admissible under
negligent hiring theory but is inadmissible under respondeat superior. See Donald
K. Armstrong, Comment, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment The Case
Against Exclusion, 52 Or. L. Rev. 296, 304-305 (1973). Compare Estate of Arrington
v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (employee's past criminal record ad-
missible under negligent hiring theory) with Parkinson v. Syracuse Transit Corp.,
279 A.D. 848, 109 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1952) (evidence of employee's prior accidents not
admissible to prove negligence at time of accident).
101. Brill, supra note 69, at 15. Respondeat superior and negligent hiring theory
are derived from two different traditions. Respondeat superior began under Greek
and Roman law and allowed recovery from the master when his family, animals, or
slaves caused harm. Conversely, negligent hiring theory developed out of the com-
mon law tradition arising from the duties employers owed to employees. The
breadth of such duties increased over time to include care in selecting fellow em-
ployees and, ultimately, a duty to third parties to employ competent persons.
Haerle, supra note 100, at 1306.
102. Brill, supra note 69, at 15.
103. Some jurisdictions require that the employer have actual knowledge of the
servant's lack of fitness before the employer is deemed negligent. Most courts re-
quire the employer to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to employment;
therefore, negligence may be based on constructive knowledge. Some courts have
held that a failure to conduct any investigation is per se negligence. Others indicate
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One commentator justified liability based on negligent hiring
theory by stating-
[I1f the master has knowledge that an employee has dangerous
propensities, such as a violent temper or sadistic tendencies,
and the master nevertheless hires him or keeps him in his em-
ploy, the master is foreseeably exposing people who will come
into contact with the servant to a serious risk of harm.04
A plaintiff who utilizes negligent hiring theory must first es-
tablish that the employer owed the plaintiff a duty to hire and re-
tain only fit employees. l0 5 A duty exists when there is some type
of connection between the plaintiff and the employer.10 6 Courts
have found a duty to exist between businesses and their custom-
ers,107 students and schools or school districts,108 prisoners and
prison officials,'0 9 tenants and landlords,110 and tenants and public
housing authorities."' Accordingly, the duty requirement could
be met by the relationship between a minister and a church
member.
Whether a court would find that a duty exists depends pri-
marily upon the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's initial con-
tact with the employee. For example, if the abusive employee had
that the employee's incompetance must be ascertainable at the time of the hiring.
Haerle, supra note 100, at 1310.
104. Brill, supra note 69, at 15-16.
105. Haerle, supra note 100, at 1308.
106. John C. North, Note, The Responsibility of Employers for the Actions of
their Employees: The Negligent Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 Chi. Kent L. Rev.
717, 721 (1977).
107. Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc., 385 Mich. 410, 412, 189 N.W.2d 286, 288
(1971) ("An employer who knew or should have known of his employee's propensi-
ties and criminal record before commission of an intentional tort by employee upon
customer who came to employer's place of business would be liable for damages to
such customer."); Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. 1951) ("One dealing
with the public is bound to use reasonable care to select employees competent and
fit... and to refrain from retaining the services of an unfit employee.").
108. Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 110 Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988)
("school district owes a duty to its students to employ ordinary care and to antici-
pate reasonably foreseeable dangers so as to take precautions for protecting the
children in its custody from such dangers"); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716
P.2d 1238, 1243-44 (Idaho 1986) (school district may be liable for its negligence when
a teacher sexually assaults students).
109. Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989) (county may be liable for
plaintiff's injuries resulting from her rape and kidnapping by the county's chief
jailer if, on remand, the court finds that the county's inadequate hiring policy was a
proximate cause of the rape); Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich.
1979) (prison officials may be liable for injuries sustained when a prisoner was
raped by fellow inmates).
110. Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673, 677-79 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Mal-
lory v. O'Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954); Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331
N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983); La Lone v. Smith, 39 Wash. 2d 167, 234 P.2d 893 (1951).
111. Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Comm'n of Montgomery, 304 Md. 705, 501
A.2d 35 (1985); P.L.C. v. Housing Auth. of Warren, 588 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
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an employment-related reason for interacting with the plaintiff, a
claim that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty is strength-
ened.1 2 A plaintiff can successfully assert the defendant owed her
a duty if the defendant initially met the plaintiff through a work-
related incident."13 Thus, if a minister sexually exploited a parish-
ioner at the parishioner's home, the church could still be held lia-
ble as a duty would exist even if the abuse did not occur on the
church's property or during work hours. In this situation, the
church's duty would be predicated on the relationship between the
minister and the parishioner which began solely because of the
minister's relationship to the church.
After establishing that the employer owed the plaintiff a
duty, the court must determine what type of duty was owed. In
most jurisdictions employers have a duty to investigate prospective
employees. 114 The investigation which an employer must under-
take to avoid liability is contingent on the type of employment in-
volvedll5 and varies positively with the severity of risk to third
persons. 116
Determining whether an employer breached this duty de-
pends upon evidence existing prior to and at the time of the hir-
ing.117 In some jurisdictions the specific injury sustained by the
plaintiff need not be foreseeable as long as there is a foreseeable
risk of some injury."l8 When an employer fails to conduct a pre-
employment investigation, several courts have held the employer
negligent per se.119
Although the requirement of a pre-employment investigation
is well-established,120 applying it to churches presents unique is-
sues arising from their internal structures. A potential problem is
how to determine when a minister is "hired". Should the hiring
date back to ordination, admission to seminary, or to placement in
each new congregation? This issue is relevant in a negligent hiring
action since the defendant is held accountable for knowledge held,
or knowledge which reasonably should have been held, at the time
112. Haerle, supra note 100, at 1308-09.
113. North, supra note 106, at 723.
114. Haerle, supra note 100, at 1310.
115. See id. at 1311.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 1313.
118. Prosser, supra note 65, at 263 (in Louisiana, Minnesota, Vermont, and Wis-
consin the foreseeability of the specific injury need not be apparent in determining
proximate cause).
119. Haerle, supra note 100, at 1310.
120. Id.
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of hiring.'12
The impact of this determination is especially important
given an all too frequent scenario: the transfer of a sexually-ex-
ploitive minister to a new, unsuspecting congregation after a for-
mer congregation discovered the minister's sexual
transgressions.'2= Consequently, a church could escape liability
under the negligent hiring theory and continue to endanger unsus-
pecting parishioners by simply asserting that hiring occurred at or-
dination. Therefore, public policy dictates that courts in clerical
sexual abuse cases should construe "hiring" as placement in a new
congregation. Such a rule should apply regardless of the length of
the minister's tenure with the larger religious institution.
One court already has found that a church had a duty to in-
vestigate the background of a non-clerical employee before hir-
ing.123 In J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, failure to
conduct a pre-employment investigation resulted in the imposition
of liability on the church for a non-clerical employee's sexual as-
sault of a ten-year old parishioner.124 The plaintiff's complaint al-
leged that the church hired and entrusted the employee with
duties in which contact with children was foreseeable. 125 It also
stated that the employee came into contact with the plaintiff
through Victory Tabernacle Baptist church and that he raped her
on at least one occassion in the church building.126
The court held the church liable for negligently hiring the
employee, who previously had been convicted of aggravated sexual
assault and whose probation terms forbade him from having con-
tact with children.127 The court found that the church failed to in-
vestigate the employee's background adequately and, therefore,
negligently hired him.128
The result in this case demonstrates that at least one jurisdic-
tion is willing to impose liability on churches for sexual abuse
committed by their non-clerical employees. This case can be used
121. See id. at 1313.
122. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
123. See J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394
(1988).
124. Id. at 392.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 394 ("To say that a negligently hired employee who acts willfully or
criminally thus relieves his employer of liability for negligent hiring when willful
or criminal conduct is precisely what the employer should have foreseen would rob
the tort of vitality by improperly subjecting it to factors that bear upon the separate
concept of employer liability based on respondeat superior.").
128. Id.
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to illustrate how dissimilar treatment of churches in cases involv-
ing clerical sexual abuse would sanction inequitable results.
Courts have also applied negligent hiring theory to impose li-
ability on public housing authorities and on apartment manage-
ment companies when an employee sexually assaults a tenant.' 29
The relationship between the tenant and the housing authority or
management company is deemed sufficient to impose a duty on the
company to hire only employees who are fit for their employment
positions.130
In these cases, the employer negligently failed to investigate
the criminal background of an employee who subsequently raped
the plaintiff. A pre-employment investigation would have re-
vealed the employee's felony convictions. Furthermore, the em-
ployee-rapist used keys furnished by the employer to gain access to
the plaintiff's apartment. Consequently, courts held the compa-
nies liable for the plaintiffs' damages.' 3i The courts stressed that
the employer's relationship with the tenant created an affirmative
duty to avoid hiring potentially dangerous employees for positions
of authority.i3 2
The liability these courts placed on housing authorities and
apartment management companies should be similarly applied to
churches for the sexual abuse of parishioners by clergy. First, as
churches receive benefits from normal clergy/parishioner contact,
a duty of reasonable care to protect the parishioner should exist.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's discussion of the benefit received
by a management company illustrates the duty which should arise
from interaction between ministers and parishioners. The court
stated:
[S]ince plaintiff comes in contact with the employee as the di-
rect result of the employment, and since the employer receives
129. See Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983); P.L.C. v.
Housing Auth. of Warren, 588 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Cramer v. Housing Op-
portunities Comm'n of Montgomery, 304 Md. 705, 501 A.2d 35 (1985).
130. See North, supra note 106, at 721.
131. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 907; P.LC., 588 F. Supp. at 962; Cramer, 304 Md. at
705, 501 A.2d at 35. In P.LC the plaintiff brought a claim against the housing au-
thority under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. In finding for the plaintiff, the court emphasized
that the housing authority was created to provide safe housing for low income peo-
ple. It noted that the plaintiff was subject to the administrative system:
For her security she surrendered the right of entry to her apartment
to the Authority which undertook the obligation of security, and pro-
vided an employee with a key by which he could gain entry in order to
carry out the Authority's function and responsibilities. This employee
used the key, his symbol and instrument of governmental authority, to
gain entrance to commit assault and rape.
P.LC., 588 F. Supp. at 965.
132. Id.
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some benefit, even if only a potential or indirect benefit, by the
contact between the plaintiff and the employee, there exists a
duty on the employer to exercise reasonable care for the pro-
tection of the dwelling occupant to retain in such employment
only those who, so far as can be reasonably ascertained, pose
no threat to such occupant.133
Examining whether a church benefits from a minister's ini-
tial contact with a plaintiff had sexual exploitation not occurred
reveals the undeniable benefit the church receives from its minis-
ters. Indeed, the church's very existence is dependent on the per-
petuation of faith which is relayed, in large part, through
ministers' instruction of parishioners.l34 Moreover, many victims
of abusive ministers were first sexually confronted while attempt-
ing to serve the church (e.g., as an altar boy) or while participating
in required or recommended church activities (e.g., confession or
religious instruction).13 5 Since ministers' non-abusive contact with
parishioners undeniably benefits churches, courts should impose a
duty of reasonable care on churches in selecting and retaining
clergy.
Second, the liability standards courts impose on apartment
management companies and housing authorities should also apply
to churches due to the similar grants of authority. Like these com-
panies, churches confer potentially abusive authority onto their
employees. For example, employees of management companies
can use a pass key to enter their victim's apartment while minis-
ters can abuse their authority by demanding compliance with sex-
ual requests and claiming such requests are religiously permissible
or mandated.
Given the authority which flows from being a minister,
churches are often negligent in hiring and retaining potentially
abusive clergy.1SS While a church hopes that a clergy member who
133. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 911 (emphasis added).
134. Bonhoeffer, supra note 98, at 10 ("The Christian Pastor is the representa-
tive of Christ's authority in the Congregation.").
135. See note 81 and accompanying text.
136. See N.Y. Times, May 4, 1986, at 26, col. 1 (A Roman Catholic priest pleaded
guilty in 1986. to thirty-three counts of sexual misconduct, admitting to sexual in-
volvement with boys at every parish he had served since his 1971 ordination. The
bishop of the diocese received notice of the priest's sexual misconduct in 1974. The
priest, however, continued to serve in parishes until 1983 when parents complained
to church officials.); N.Y. Times, June 12, 1986, at 24, col. 1 (In 1988 a Washington
Roman Catholic priest was removed from his parish for sexual molestation of chil-
dren. The chancellor of the Seattle Archdiocese admitted that there had been alle-
gations of pedophilia over the last twenty years against this particular priest.);
Statement of Facts, supra note 81, at 7-8 (In Minnesota a priest suffering from
pedophilia sexually abused at least ten boys and perhaps as many as twenty-five be-
tween 1961 and 1982. Evidence suggests that at least some diocese officials knew of
the abuse as early as 1964. The priest remained in the parish until 1984, however,
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has received counseling for psychosexual dysfunctions is in fact
cured, society should demand more than mere hope from the insti-
tution of which he is an agent. The church takes an unjustifiable
risk by allowing the clergy member to resume service in a parish
where close, unsupervised interaction with parishioners is inevita-
ble. Consequently, a church should not be able to avoid liability
when an unsuspecting individual is injured because the church
chose to take such a risk.137
Keeping sexually abusive ministers in a parish is arguably
more dangerous than handing the master keys to the convicted
rapist. The authoritative position the minister has over the parish-
ioner heightens his potential control. Such control involves psy-
chological, spiritual, and emotional manipulation of the
parishioner.1 38
Many victims believe that the abusing minister has a direct
link to the Divine. Therefore, victims may hesitate to question the
legitimacy of a minister's sexual requests.1 39 After all, the minis-
ter represents the church, an organization which claims its teach-
ings have divine origin.140 Most Christian denominations assert
when the archdiocese received a summons and complaint.). A three-month study
of court records confirmed that churches frequently will tranfer the sexually ex-
ploitive minister to a new congregation instead of removing him from pastoral prac-
tice. The study revealed that this pattern held true in approximately twenty-five
dioceses of the Roman Catholic Church throughout the country. Sherman, supra
note 6, at 29.
137. This is not to say that a pedophilic minister should never be able to serve as
a religious leader. Rather, churches must acknowledge that there is no guaranteed
treatment plan and supervise the minister carefully. See McDonough, supra note
72, at.5:
[W]e place priest sex offenders into very limited and highly structured
pastoral settings after the completion of aftercare.... [W]e ensure that
a priest who has a history of offending is placed in a situation where
significant members of his staff or leadership people in the congrega-
tion are aware of the history.
Church officials also must provide abusive ministers with therapy or other
treatment. See Interfaith Committee, supra note 72, at 34. ("Reassignment to pre-
viously held positions in ministry will be possible only where the professional ther-
apeutic community judges that the inappropriate sexual behavior was the result of
psychological or environmental conditions which have been fully remedied.").
138. See Woodward, supra note 8, at 48-49.
139. See Milla v. Tamayo, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 1457, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 687
(1986); Woodward, supra note 8, at 48-49; L.A. Times, Feb. 6, 1986, at 2, col. 4 (an
eleven year old boy who had been repeatedly molested by his priest stated, "I
thought he was doing the right thing because he was a priest."). See also Mpls. Star
& Trib., Dec. 11, 1988, at le, col. 1 (victim of a pedophilic priest stated, "It was like,
you just trust him. There was no question about that. He was an authority figure
that you look up to and trust. Not like a parent. That's how I felt. Someone I
looked up to, someone I trusted. I had no reason at the time, not to.").
140. See, e.g., Matthew 28:16-20.
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that their ministers stand in a special relationship to God.141 In-
deed, many claim their ministers are personally called by God.
Thus, the church cloaks its clergy members with religious
authority.42
This authority includes the power to grant forgiveness and
correspondingly the power not to grant forgiveness, to interpret
Scripture and church dogma, to provide spiritual guidance, and to
serve as pastoral counselors. Ministers also are held forth as
moral, law-abiding, and principled people. Churches encourage
their parishioners to seek counsel from clergy, to view them as
spiritual leaders, and to place great trust and faith in clerical judg-
ment.143 When an institution places this kind of authority on an
agent, the institution should have a corresponding legal'" and
moral'45 duty to insure the fitness of such an agent. Accordingly,
under the negligent hiring theory, churches should have an affirm-
ative duty to investigate their clergy.
D. Negligent Retention Theory
Finally, the negligent retention theory should serve to hold
churches liable for clerical sexual exploitation of parishioners.
Under the negligent retention theory, an employer is held liable
for retaining an employee whom it knows or should have known is
unfit for the employment position.146 Similar to negligent hiring,
the negligent retention theory places an affirmative investigative
duty on the employer.147 When an employer knows or should
have known about allegations of sexual abuse by an employee, it
has a duty to investigate the allegations and act pursuant to its
141. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
142. Interfaith Committee, supra note 72, at 6-7. "All clergy need to be aware of
the power that their office carries. The authority of their leadership is unques-
tioned by many. Clergy persons need to realize that the power differential nor-
mally present in a counseling setting is intensified by the increased trust and
respect many people have for clergy."
143. See generally Woodward, supra note 8, at 48-49 (most Americans turn first
to members of the clergy when experiencing personal problems). See also Peter
Ruther, Sex in the Forbidden Zone, Psychology Today, Oct. 1989, at 34, 36 (noting
that therapists and clergy frequently encourage women whom they are counseling
to reveal their secrets, including sexual secrets, which they would not disclose to
another person).
144. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
145. See Interfaith Committee, supra note 72, at 4:
Fear of the legal consequences may indeed provide the motivating
force to move us in the right direction. However, as persons who claim
to be the people of God, we must be motivated by a genuine concern
for our fellow human beings and the desire to be faithful to moral and
ethical obligations and responsibilities.
146. 29 Am. Jur. Trials p. 272-77.
147. Id. at 285.
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findings.148 Consequently, evidence which indicates that the em-
ployer had notice of the abuser's problem yet failed to take reason-
able action strengthens the plaintiff's case.149 The victims of
sexual abuse in non-religious contexts have recovered damages by
establishing notice as such notice fortifies the plaintiff's allega-
tions that it was the employer's negligent retention of the em-
ployee which caused the plaintiff's damages. 150
When applying negligent retention theory, courts focus on
whether the employer had notice concerning past sexual impropri-
eties and on what measures, if any, the employer took to repri-
mand or dismiss the abusing agent.'51 As discussed above, notice
of sexual abuse requires that the employer investigate and act ac-
cordingly;152 failure to take the requisite action can render the em-
ployer liable.153 To impose liability, it is helpful if the plaintiff is a
member of an identifiable class of potential victims. 5 4 For exam-
ple, if a church is on notice that a certain minister is a pedophile
and yet fails to take action, the church's liability is clearer when
the victim is a child rather than an adult.
When applied to religious institutions, this analysis illustrates
that churches should have a legal responsibility to investigate alle-
gations of sexual misconduct against clergy and a corresponding
duty to act in accordance with their findings. This duty would en-
compass the reporting of sexual abuse to the proper civil, as well
as to ecclesiastical, authorities; 5 5 removing the minister from his
148. Id. at 286.
149. Id. at 289 (plaintiff does not need to prove defendant had actual knowledge
as constructive knowledge will suffice; demonstrating defendant had access to in-
formation which would have established employee's incompetence is beneficial to
plaintiff's case).
150. See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. denied 110 S.Ct. 840 (1990). In Stoneking evidence indicated that school
officials received notice of the band director's abusive behavior in 1979. Id. at 722.
The band director's abuse of the plaintiff began in 1980 and continued through 1985.
Id. Sexual activity occurred, among other places, in the high school band room and
on band trips. I& at 724. The court noted that students have a liberty interest in
being free from sexual harassment and abuse. The sexual advances and abuse per-
petrated by the band director violated the plaintiff's right of personal bodily integ-
rity. Id. at 726. See also Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (Idaho 1986)
(school district may be held liable for its negligence arising out of teacher's sexual
assault of students); Galli v. Kirkeby, 398 Mich. 527, 248 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Mich.
1976) (school board may be liable under doctrine of respondeat superior for princi-
pal's homosexual assaults on a student); Schultz v. Gould Academy, 332 A.2d 368
(Me. 1975) (boarding school liable when intruder gains access to dormitory room
and assaults female student).
151. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 727.
152. Id. at 729.
153. Id. at 730 (citing Black v. Skrang 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981)).
154. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 730.
155. Interfaith Committee, supra note 72, at 10-11.
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parish; and monitoring the minister if he is returned to the parish
after completion of psychotherapy or other appropriate treat-
ment.156 Also, as it is important to provide help for all the victims
of a sexually abusive minister, past congregations in which he
served must be notified of his problems. In addition, after an abu-
sive pastor undergoes treatment, the church should be required to
notify ministers with whom the abusing minister works of any re-
strictions placed on his work. Finally, if he later serves as the sole
pastor of a congregation, the congregation's church council should
be notified by the denomination's governing body of his past sex-
ual improprieties. 157
The purpose of imposing this duty is not to start a witch hunt
to uncover all the skeletons in a minister's closet. Rather, it is an
acknowledgment that there is a problem of clerical sexual abuse,
that such abuse is often criminal behavior, 15 s and that it always er-
odes the ministry of the church. 15 9 Churches must acknowledge
that these clergy members are using the church's power and au-
thority to victimize vulnerable parishioners. Churches may argue
that it was the minister who harmed the victim not the church.
156. With the influx of cases alleging clerical sexual abuse, many religious de-
nominations have devoloped policies to deal with the crisis. In Minnesota, churches
have established an interdenominational network to address sexual exploitation by
the clergy. Woodward, supra note 8, at 48. Also, the Archdiocese of St. Paul-Min-
neapolis has developed a policy addressing many issues, including investigation of
the victim's complaint, confrontation of the priest, treatment of abusing priests, and
placement of such priests after they have received treatment. The Archdiocese
generally will offer counseling for the victims; investigate the complaint by talking
with the victim's family, other clergy, or lay professionals who may have worked
with the priest; and, ultimately, confront the abusive priest. Frequent communica-
tion with civil authorities is considered imperative. The Archdiocese also will pro-
vide the accused priest with an advocate who offers support to the priest. It does
not provide an advocate for victims but is considering implementing a victim's advo-
cate program. Sexually exploitive priests are required to undergo an extensive
evaluation followed by psychological and spiritual treatment. The period of struc-
tured aftercare may exceed two years. After such a period, priests may be placed
back in a pastoral setting under certain circumstances. McDonough, supra note 72,
at 8-16.
157. See N.Y. Times, June 12, 1988, at 24, col. 1, in which a priest who was aware
of another priest's past pedophilia admitted:
in retrospect, he would have told the parish council about the priest's
background and let them decide what to do with him. 'Do you spread
the news that a person is a pedophile or try to protect his confidential-
ity?' said Father Kramis. 'A year ago, when I welcomed him into my
rectory, I was convinced confidentiality was the best way to go. Now, I
would tell the parish council.'
158. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
159. See Interfaith Committee, supra note 72, at 9. Sexual exploitation of a pa-
rishioner by a minister devastates, and frequently divides, a congregation. Some
members blame the victim and others blame the minister. A spiritual crisis also is
a common reaction from congregational members. Id.
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But this argument fails because an agent of the church harmed the
victim, not by means of a gun or violence, but by the clerical au-
thority which the church gave the agent with its blessing.160
HI. State Legislatures Should Impose a Statutory Duty on Churches
to Investigate Clergy
As the discussion of respondeat superior revealed, there are
numerous similarities between psychotherapists and ministers.161
Briefly, both are in authoritative positions, have substantial con-
tact with vulnerable individuals, and are relied upon by such indi-
viduals to provide counseling services.' 6 2 Consequently, they
should be treated similarly by state legislatures.
In response to the influx of reported cases involving sexual
exploitation of patients by psychotherapists,16 3 some state legisla-
tures have imposed a statutory duty on mental health clinics to in-
vestigate their psychotherapists prior to their employment with
the clinic.164 Minnesota Statute § 148A is a good example. 65
160. See, e.g., State v. French, 392 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. App. 1986). In French the
sexual abuser was a church elder whose coercion prevented the victim from report-
ing the abuse. He told the victim that no one would believe her story as he was a
respected member of the church and community. The victim thus did not press
criminal charges against the abuser until she was an adult. By that time, the stat-
ute of limitations precluded any criminal action.
161. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
163. See generally Task Force on Sexual Exploitation by Counselors and Ther-
apists, Report to the Minnesota Legislature (Feb. 1985). Recent studies reveal some
alarming statistics. One report found that 17.1 percent of male and 2 percent of fe-
male psychologists responding to the survey had engaged in some sexual contact
with patients either during therapy or within three months following termination
of therapy. Id. at 7. Another estimates that one in five psychotherapists will be
sexually involved with his or her patients. Id. A different study revealed that fifty
percent of psychiatrists participating in the study knew of particular cases of sexual
contact between the patient and therapist, yet most had not reported these inci-
dents to the proper authorities. Id. A California task force discovered that fifty-
seven percent of psychologists responding to its survey indicated that they had been
informally approached by other therapists with concerns regarding their sexual in-
volvement with patients. Id.
164. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 188A.01-.03 (1986).
148A.02 CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
A cause of action against a psychotherapist for sexual exploitation
exists for a patient or former patient for injury caused by sexual con-
tact with the psychotherapist, if the sexual contact occurred:
(1) during the period the patient was receiving psychotherapy
from the psychotherapist; or
(2) after the period the patient received psychotherapy from the
psychotherapist if (a) the former patient was emotionally dependent
on the psychotherapist; or (b) the sexual contact occurred by means of
therapeutic deception.
The patient or former patient may recover damages from a psy-
chotherapist who is found liable for sexual exploitation. It is not a de-
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Under this statute, the employer of the psychotherapist may
be liable "if the employer knows or has reason to know that the
psychotherapist engaged in sexual activity with the plaintiff[, an-
other] patient or [a] former patient."16 6 In addition, the employer
may be liable if it fails to inquire from the psychotherapist's past
employers as to the existence of any sexual impropriety between
the therapist and his/her patients.1 67 Employers are also required
to take action when notified of sexual misconduct.1 68 "An em-
ployer of a psychotherapist may be liable.. .if .. the employer fails
or refuses to take reasonable action when the employer knows or
has reason to know that the psychotherapist engaged in sexual
contact with the plaintiff or any other patient or former patient of
fense to the action that sexual contact with a patient occurred outside
a therapy or treatment session or that it occurred off the premises reg-
ularly used by the psychotherapist for therapy or treatment sessions.
148A.03 LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER
(a) An employer of a psychotherapist may be liable under sec-
tion 148A.02 if:
(1) the employer fails or refuses to take reasonable action when
the employer knows or has reason to know that the psychotherapist
engaged in sexual contact with the plaintiff or any other patient or
former patient of the psychotherapist; or
(2) the employer fails or refuses to make inquiries of an em-
ployer or former employer, whose name and address have been dis-
closed to the employer and who employed the psychotherapist as a
psychotherapist within the last five years, concerning the occurrence
of sexual contacts by the psychotherapist with patients or former pa-
tients of the psychotherapist.
(b) An employer or former employer of a psychotherapist may
be liable under section 148A.02 if the employer or former employer:
(1) knows of the occurrence of sexual contact by the psychother-
apist with patients or former patients of the psychotherapist;
(2) receives a specific written request by another employer or
prospective employer of the psychotherapist, engaged in the business
of psychotherapy, concerning the existence or nature of the sexual
contact; and
(3) fails or refuses to disclose the occurence of the sexual con-
tacts.
(c) An employer or former employer may be liable under section
148A.02 only to the extent that the failure or refusal to take any action
required by paragraph (a) or (b) was a proximate and actual cause of
any damages sustained.
(d) No cause of action arises, nor may a licensing board in this
state take disciplinary action, against a psychotherapist's employer or
former employer who in good faith complies with this section.
The Minnesota statute includes clergy members in its definition of psychother-
apist provided the clergy "performs or purports to perform psychotherapy." Minn.
Stat. §§ 148A.01, subd. 5. Consequently, a church may not be liable under the stat-
ute for a minister's sexual abuse of an individual who sought religious guidance as
opposed to psychotherapy.
165. Minn. Stat. §§ 148A.01-.03 (1986).
166. Id., § 148A.03(a)(1).
167. Id., § 148A.03(a)(2).
168. Id., § 148A.03(a)(1).
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the psychotherapist."169 Sexual activity between the psychothera-
pist and patient or former patient is actionable even if the sexual
activity did not occur during a therapy session or on the premises
usually used for counseling.170 Clergy members are included in
the definition of psychotherapist. 171
Such legislation holding churches accountable should be en-
acted in other states for four reasons. First, efficiency and consis-
tency of results dictate that legislatures prescribe the duty which
churches owe in one comprehensive law rather than leaving it to
the piecemeal decision-making of the courts. Moreover, the legis-
lature has superior fact-finding abilities, including the requisite re-
sources and authority to conduct hearings and formulate policy.
Second, the severity and prevalence of the problem requires states
to take action to protect potential victims.172 Since many sexual
abusers were sexually abused as children, the public hazard cre-
ated by suppressing recovery for such abuse is staggering. 7 3 Bar-
ring recovery arguably prevents victims from receiving the
monetary resources necessary to procure counseling services and
break the abuse cycle. Therefore, state legislatures should inter-
vene not only to protect the welfare of its citizenry but also to en-
sure victims receive adequate treatment so they themselves do not
become abusers. Victims of sexual abuse may well increase expo-
nentially as some of today's victims later victimize others. To pre-
vent an epidemic of abuse, the legislatures must take reasonable
action.
Third, imposing a statutory duty which explicitly specifies the
investigation a church must conduct prior to "hiring" a minister
helps the church avoid the immense financial174 as well as emo-
tional 175 burden that sexual abuse lawsuits entail. The statute
should expressly prohibit any cause of action against a church or
former church which in good faith complies with the statute.176
Accordingly, the statute would serve to protect churches as well as
plaintiffs.
Fourth, without a statutory requirement, a church which re-
quires its congregation to investigate a prospective minister for any
169. Id.
170. Id. § 148A.02.
171. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legis-
lation, 240 (1988).
172. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Nickolas A. Groth & H. Jean Birbnaum, Men Who Rape: The Psy-
chology of the Offender (1979); Kohn, Shattered Innocence, Feb. 1987, at 54-58.
174. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
175. Interfaith Committee, supra note 72, at 9.
176. Minn. Stat. § 148A.03(d) (1986).
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past sexual impropriety risks alienating that minister from the
congregation. This places a congregation which wants to make a
responsible investigation in a Catch-22 position. It may alienate a
potential minister by conducting a'thorough investigation, but is
vulnerable to multi-million dollar lawsuits if the investigation is
not thorough enough. Consequently, lack of a statutory duty in-
hibits churches from acting prudently and conducting adequate
investigations.
Conclusion
Victims of sexual exploitation may recover from institutions
of which the victim's attacker was an agent, provided that the vic-
tim stands in a special relationship to the institution. Anoma-
lously, this general rule has not been applied to churches for the
sexual abuse of parishioners by their ministers. This leads to the
inequitable result that similarly situated plaintiffs receive differ-
ent treatment under the law. State legislatures should rectify this
inequality by adopting statutes providing for the liability of
churches in these cases as well as defining the investigative duty a
church must undergo to avoid liability.

